

Eng 3

SOME
CONSIDERATIONS
ON THE
Principal Objections
AND
ARGUMENTS
Which have been Publish'd against
Mr. *Lock's* Essay
OF
HUMANE UNDERSTANDING.

By SAMUEL BOLD, Rector of
Steeple, "Dorset.


Re enim intellecta, in verborum usu faciles esse debemus.
Cic. de Fin. l. 3.

LONDON:
Printed for A. and J. Churchill, at the Black
Swan in Pater-Noster-Row. 1699.

B 1294

B 65

Rare 3K



S O M E
CONSIDERATIONS

On the Principal

Objections and Arguments

Which have been Publish'd against
Mr. *Lock's* Essay of *Humane Under-
standing*.

§I. **I**T is no Disparagement, I conceive, to
any Book, nor an Attributing more to
Mr. *Lock's* Essay of *Humane Understand-
ing*, than it most justly deserves, to say,
That Essay is a Book the best Adapted
of any I know, to serve the Interest of Truth,
Natural, Moral, and Divine : And that it is the
most Worthy, most Noble, and best Book I
ever read, excepting those which were writ by
Persons Divinely inspir'd. This excellent Trea-
tise having been published several Years, and
received through all the Learned World with
very great Approbation, by those who under-
stood English, a mighty Out cry was at last, all
on

B

100823

on the sudden, raised against it here at Home. There was, no doubt, some reason or other, why so many hands should be employed, just at the same time, to Attack and Batter this *Essay*; tho' what was the weighty consideration, which put them all in motion, may, perhaps, continue a long time a Secret. Several Persons have discovered their Inclination to find fault with this Treatise, by nibbling at several passages in it, which it appears they did not understand, and concerning which they have been at a loss how to express themselves Intelligibly. Some have spoken handsomly of the Author, others have treated that Incomparable Gentleman with a rudeness peculiar to some, who make a Profession of the Christian Religion, and seem to pride themselves in being of the Clergy of the Church of *England*. But whatever Reputation may accrue to them on either of those accounts, their Conduct doth not contribute any thing to the Honour either of the one or of the other.

§ II. The principal Passages in this excellent Treatise, which have been insisted on as faulty, are these two: First, *Certainty of Knowledge is, to perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, as expressed in any Proposition. This (saith Mr. Lock) we usually call Knowing, or being certain of the Truth of any Proposition. Essay of Humane Understanding, B. 4. c. 6. § 3. Secondly, We have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know, whether any meer natural Being thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own Ideas,*

Ideas, without Revelation, to discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to Matter so disposed, a thinking immaterial Substance: It being, in respect of our Notions, not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive, that God can, if he pleases, super-add to our Idea of Matter a faculty of thinking, than that he should super-add to it another substance, with a faculty of thinking; since we know not wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort of Substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that power, which cannot be in any created Being, but meerly by the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator. Essay, &c. B. 4. c. 3. § 6. To which I will add, the better to shew Mr. Lock's sense, the following words, which he immediately subjoyns on this occasion; which those, who have thought fit to except against what he says here, have thought fit always to omit, how fairly I will not say. Mr. Lock's following words are, For I see no contradiction in it, that the first Eternal thinking Being, or Omnipotent Spirit, should, if he pleased, give to certain Systems of created senseless Matter, put together as he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception and thought; tho', as I think, I have proved, lib. 4. c. 10. it is no less than a contradiction to suppose Matter (which is evidently in its own nature void of sense and thought) should be that Eternal first thinking Being.

§ III. Against the first passage, viz. Certainty of Knowledge, is to perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, as expressed in any Proposition. There are two Charges exhibited: First, That

the Proposition is not true. In consequence of which, *the way of Ideas* is condemned as *no way at all to Certainty, or Knowledge*; and in opposition to the way of Ideas, we are told, That to argue or make Inferences from *Maxims*, is the way to *Knowledge or Certainty*. Secondly, That the Proposition is inconsistent with, and of dangerous consequence to the *Articles of the Christian Faith*.

§ IV. First, It is said that the Proposition is not true. Now, in order to make a right determination, whether the Proposition be true or no, it may be fit to consider in what the Truth of a Proposition doth consist: For, I suppose it will be allowed, that our being certain of, or knowing the Truth of a Proposition, doth consist in our perceiving that wherein the truth of the Proposition doth consist; otherwise we may know, or be certain, that a Proposition is true, tho' it be not true, which carries such a sound with it, I conceive few will be ambitious to grant it, whatever way they take to attain to Certainty. The truth of a Proposition consists in words being so put together in the Proposition, as exactly to express the agreement or disagreement of the Ideas they stand for, as really it is. This Mr. Lock calls *Certainty of Truth*, just before those words in his Book which are pretended to be faulty. This passage I take for granted, will be permitted to pass for true, not only because no objection hath been started against it, after so strict a scrutiny, to find out something from whence a colour might be taken, to give the Book an ill Name, but because otherwise it must

must be owned, that a Proposition may be true tho' it is not true ; or tho' the agreement or disagreement of the Ideas, signified by the terms which make up the Proposition, is not such as the Proposition doth express. And if the truth of a Proposition doth consist in what hath been related, it is most evident that our being certain of, or knowing the truth of a Proposition, must consist in our perceiving that the Ideas, for which the words, which make up the Proposition (or of which the Proposition doth consist) do stand, do so agree, or disagree, as the Proposition doth express. For there is no way, by which we can attain to be certain, or to know that the Ideas do so agree, or disagree, as the Proposition doth declare they do, but by perceiving that they do so agree, or disagree, unless certainty, or knowledge of the truth of Propositions, may be had without *perception*, or without perceiving the truth of what is expressed. And if it may be had, without perceiving the truth of what is expressed, perception is of so little moment, or use to certainty, or knowledge, that those who can digest that Notion, may easily be of the opinion, That Matter considered meerly as an extended, bulky, figur'd Substance, may be certain of, or know the truth of Propositions, tho' it cannot think or perceive. This I suppose may suffice, to manifest that Mr. *Lock's* Proposition is true ; and consequently, that the way of Ideas is a sure, and indeed the only way to Certainty or Knowledge, so far as Men are capable of attaining to know the truth of Propositions. Yet because

another way to Certainty or Knowledge is proposed in opposition to the way of Ideas, *viz.* The way of Maxims, or of Arguing, and making or drawing Inferences from Maxims, I will briefly consider that way, and what opposition it hath to the way of Ideas. But several Propositions, commonly reputed and looked on as Maxims, being not true, unless taken in a very limited sense, I will change the term Maxims, and place Self-evident Propositions in its room. Now Self-evident Propositions have this in common with other Propositions, That they consist of Words, which stand for Ideas. And there is no way, by which a Person can be certain, or know the truth of a Proposition, we call Self-evident, but by perceiving that the Ideas, signified by the words of which the Proposition doth consist, have such a connection or agreement, or repugnancy, or disagreement, as the Proposition doth express; for tho' the Proposition be such, that no other Idea is needful, or can be made use of to help any Man to a certainty, or knowledge, that the Proposition is true, because the Ideas signified by the words, have, by an immediate comparison of them, a visible agreement, or disagreement, yet no Person can be certain, or can know that the Proposition is true, who does not perceive that the Ideas, signified by the terms of which the Proposition doth consist, do so agree, or disagree, as the Proposition doth express. Nor can it be said to be a Self-evident Proposition, to him who doth not perceive that the Ideas do so agree, or disagree, as the Proposition declares

clares they do. And if there can be no way, by which Persons can attain to be certain of the truth of those Propositions we call Self-evident, but this of perceiving the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, as expressed in them, the only way, by which we can attain to know the truth of other Propositions, must be that of comparing Ideas, that being the only way whereby we can attain to perceive their agreement or disagreement.

§ V. A Person's being certain of the truth of a Proposition we call Self-evident, doth not make him know the truth of another Proposition. It may be a great help to his attaining to know the truth of other Propositions, but it will not contribute any other way to his being certain of the truth of other Propositions, than as it helps him to perceive that the agreement, or disagreement of the Ideas, signified by the words which make up those Propositions, is such as the Propositions express. He that knows the truth of a Self-evident Proposition, may, by the help of that Proposition, easily attain to be certain of the truth of another Proposition, which hath an immediate connection with it; but his knowledge of the truth of the latter Proposition, will consist in his perceiving that the Ideas, signified by the words of which it consists, have such agreement, or disagreement, as the Proposition doth express: For, if he does not perceive that, he cannot be certain that the Proposition is true, tho' he is most certain that the former Proposition is true. If the Proposition he would know the truth of, be some-

what remote from the Self evident Proposition, by the means of which he may attain to know the truth of it, he must make use of intermediate Ideas : And whether the process be from the Proposition to be proved, to the Self-evident Proposition, or from the Self-evident Proposition to that he would know the truth of, all the intermediate Ideas must have a Self-evident agreement, or disagreement, with one another, throughout the whole train of the Argumentation : And this agreement, or disagreement, must, all along, in every step be perceived, or certainty of the truth, of the Proposition to be proved, cannot be obtained. If any one of the intermediate Ideas, have not a Self-evident agreement, or disagreement, with those next unto it ; or if it have such agreement or disagreement with them, but the Person who would know the truth of the Proposition doth not perceive it, his knowledge will unavoidably stop there, and cannot possibly proceed any further, any more than the parts of a Chain can hang together, when one of the Links is broken and lost ; or than a Person can from *One*, make up the Number *Five*, and yet leave out either 2, 3, or 4. This I take to be demonstratively certain, unless Certainty or Knowledge may be had without Perception. Perhaps it will be pretended, that we come to Certainty or Knowledge, not by perceiving the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, but by Inferring, or making Rational Deductions from known Self-evident Principles, or Propositions. To this I answer, That he who doth Rationally infer
any

any thing, or makes a Rational Deduction, does not do it, that by that means he may attain to Certainty or Knowledge, but that he may assist and help others to that Knowledge or Certainty he hath already obtained, by laying before them, in a train of Propositions, the connection of all the intermediate Ideas, whereby the first and the last are tied together. For a Person to make a deduction Rationally, doth suppose his being Certain, or Knowing, or perceiving that what he deduces, hath such an agreement or disagreement, with the Propositions from which he doth deduce it, as his Inference doth express. If a Man will infer, and make deductions Rationally, he must antecedently perceive the agreement, or disagreement, of the Ideas about which he is concerned, otherwise he can have no reason to make Deductions : And if he does make Deductions, and they prove to be Rational, it is meerly by chance that they do so ; and he cannot be properly said to have made them Rationally. If a Man will infer, and make Deductions at all Adventures, before he can be certain that his Inferences are true, he must examine them, and compare the Ideas in the Propositions from which he hath deduced them. He cannot be certain that his Inferences, consider'd barely as Propositions, are true, any other way, than by perceiving that the Ideas, signified by the words of which they consist, do so agree, or disagree, as those Propositions express. He cannot be certain that they are true, consider'd as Inferences, any other way than by perceiving the agreement, or disagreement, they have

have with the Propositions from which they were deduced. Inferring, and making Deductions, seems not to me to be the only way to Certainty, but comparing Ideas, which is the only way to perceive their agreement or disagreement. And Self-evident Principles, or Propositions, and the use that can be made of them to help us to Certainty, are so far from having any opposition to the way of Ideas, that neither their Truth can be known, nor any Profitable Use (with respect to Truth) be made of them, but by the way of Ideas.

§ VI. The second Charge produced against this Proposition, is, That it is of dangerous consequence to, and inconsistent with *the Articles of the Christian Faith*. This Charge seems to be grounded on the last words of Mr. Lock's Proposition, *viz. As expressed in any Proposition*. Now some Propositions come to us by Divine Revelation; and several of these Propositions are such, we cannot perceive by comparing the Ideas, signify'd by the words of which they consist, that they do so agree or disagree, as the Propositions do express. It follows therefore, from Mr. Lock's Proposition, that we cannot be certain of, or know the Truth of those Propositions; and this is said to be inconsistent with, or of dangerous consequence to the Articles of the Christian Faith, but I cannot understand for what reason it is said to be so. For as the truth of all Propositions, come they to us by what way soever, consists in what hath been before mentioned, so our being certain of, or knowing the truth of any Proposition, let it come to us by

by what way soever, must consist in that, wherein our being certain of, or knowing the truth of any Proposition doth consist : For the way how a Proposition is brought to us, doth not alter its nature, consider'd as a Proposition, nor the nature of Certainty, or Knowledge, which are fixed, and unchangeable, and always the same, and therefore cannot make Certainty, or Knowledge of its truth, to consist in any thing, but what Certainty or Knowledge of the truth of a Proposition, brought to us some other way, doth consist in. If it shall now be ask'd, Whether, seeing there are certain Propositions which come to us by Divine Revelation, and we cannot perceive that the agreement or disagreement of the Ideas, signify'd by the words in those Propositions, is such as the Propositions express, Mr. *Lock's* Proposition is not inconsistent with, and of dangerous consequence to those Articles of the Christian Faith? I answer, That when an account is given of the determined Ideas, for which those phrases, *inconsistent with*, and *of dangerous consequence*, do stand, whether they are used in different senses, or both be designed to signify one and the same thing : And what that, or those precise Ideas are, which are meant by them, distinct and proper Answers may be given to the Question, or Questions propounded. If by inconsistent with those Articles, is meant inconsistent with the truth of those Articles ; and so the Question amounts to this, Whether that Proposition of Mr. *Locks* can be true, and those Articles true too? The Answer is Yes, very well ; for the truth

truth of those Propositions doth not depend on our being certain of, or knowing the truth of them. If by inconsistent with those Articles be meant, that we cannot be certain of, or know the truth of those Articles, then the Question will be, Whether it will not follow from Mr. *Lock's* Proposition, that we cannot be certain of, or know the truth of those Articles? To which the Answer is, Yes. But the Proposition, for all that, is inconsistent enough with those Articles, tho' it cannot consist well with Peoples pretending to know what God hath set out of their reach, and which they cannot attain to know. It is no wrong at all to those Articles, to say we cannot be certain of, or know the truth of them; it is a speaking of the truth, and an attributing unto them the preheminance which God hath given them. If Persons are resolv'd they will use this phrase, inconsistent with Articles of the Christian Faith in this sense, there is no help for it; yet Mr. *Lock's* Proposition will continue true, and cannot do any injury to any one *Article of the Christian Faith*. But what will become then (may some say) of those Articles of the Christian Faith, or of those Propositions which come to us by Divine Revelation, and the truth of which we cannot be certain of, or know? Answer: They will continue just as they are, very great, even Divine and Incomprehensible Truths; and they are to have all the Entertainment given them by us, that Divine Revelation designs they should have. Whatever Propositions are brought to us by Divine Revelation, and proposed to us by

by it, to be the Objects of our Knowledge, they are so formed, that we may perceive that the agreement or disagreement of the Ideas, signified by the words of which they do consist, is such as the Propositions express. And we have no other way to be certain of, or to know the truth of those Propositions, but by perceiving that the Ideas do so agree, or disagree, as the Propositions express. But as for those Propositions, which come to us by Divine Revelations, and are such, that we cannot perceive that the Ideas, signify'd by the words of which they consist, have such agreement or disagreement, as the Propositions express, they are not proposed to us, by Divine Revelation, to be *Objects of our Knowledge*, but only of *our Faith*. And tho' we do not, nor can know, or be certain of the truth of these Propositions, yet if we do firmly, and with full assurance, believe them to be true, because we have good satisfaction that God hath revealed them; and if our belief of their truth, hath all that efficacy and influence on us, which Divine Revelation requires, we do fully answer the design of Divine Revelation, with respect to these Articles of the Christian Faith. But is not Faith (may some say) a Reasonable Act? Yes: But all reasonable Assent is not Certainty or Knowledge. My assent to the truth of a Proposition, or my believing it to be true, is a Reasonable Act, not because I am certain, or do know that it is true, but because my Assent is founded on such Evidence that it is true, as is every way sufficient to justify my Assenting

to it. There cannot be a more Reasonable Act, than to believe the truth of that Proposition, which we are on good grounds satisfied is declared to be true, by that God who cannot Lye. Let any Man produce a Proposition, that Divine Revelation hath brought to Light, and make it appear to me that it came to Men by Divine Revelation, I shall believe it, or assent most firmly to the truth of it, tho' I cannot know the truth of it; and my doing so, will be a most Reasonable Act, because my assent will be grounded on Divine Testimony. But let that Person, or any other Persons, frame another Proposition in Philosophical Terms, concerning the same matter, and then pretend, that that Proposition declares something more concerning that matter, than God hath revealed concerning it, if I cannot perceive that the Ideas, signify'd by the words of that Proposition, do agree or disagree as the Proposition expresses, I cannot be certain, or know that the Proposition is true; nor will my assenting to the truth of it, upon his or their saying it is true, be a Reasonable Act. For the Proposition being about a matter out of his or their reach, I have not sufficient evidence to assure me that it is true; yet, notwithstanding the latter Proposition doth consist of different words from the former, if it be declared that neither more nor less is meant by these words, than is signify'd by those in the other Proposition, I can assent to the truth of it, and my assent will be a Reasonable Act, because tho' they are two distinct Propositions consider'd as to the words, yet as to sense they

they are but one, and exactly the same. Well, but at this rate, what becomes of the *Certainty of Faith*? Answer. *Certainty*, and *Faith*, are two words, which stand for, or signifie two distinct Acts of the Mind; and they can no more be properly affirmed of one another, than those distinct Acts can be said to be one and the same. Indeed, a Person may use the word *Certainty*, or *Knowledge*, if he please, for Assent, grounded upon probable Evidence, or for Assent founded on Authority, or for any other Idea he hath a mind to call by that Name; and if he certifies what the Idea is, he hath a mind to signifie by that word, his Discourse may be Intelligible, if he constantly use the word in that sense. But if he will oppose another Person, who hath declared that he useth the word *Certainty*, and *Knowledge*, strictly taken, in the same sense, and doth not declare that he takes the word *Certainty* in another sense, his Discourse will unavoidably be very obscure, if not perfectly unintelligible: For it will be presumed he useth the word in that sense, in which the other Person had declared he did use it, when all the while he means another thing by it.

§ VII. When it is said that Mr. *Lock's* Proposition is of dangerous consequence to the Articles of the Christian Faith, if something else is signify'd by it, than what was meant by the former phrase, a distinct Account should be given of what is intended by this phrase. If any shall pretend that the true and just consequence of Mr. *Lock's* Proposition is this, That the Ar-
 ticles

cles of the Christian Faith are not to be believed, the Proposition pretended to be deduced is a very wicked Proposition. But then it is as plain, and certain as any thing can be, That it can no way be drawn from Mr. *Lock's* Proposition, which has no relation at all to any Articles of Faith, or Belief, either Christian, or other. If Mr. *Lock's* Proposition can concern, or affect any *Christian Articles*, they must be *Articles of Christian Knowledge*, not of *Christian Faith*. And his Proposition is so far from being of dangerous consequence to Articles of Christian Knowledge, that it gives the true Account wherein the knowledge of those Articles doth consist, as will most evidently appear, when any of those Articles shall be instanced in and considered. If it shall be pretended, that from Mr. *Lock's* Proposition it may be regularly inferred, That no Man ought to believe, that any Proposition is true, but what he can attain to know the truth of, and that he ought not to assent to the truth of it, till he attains to be certain of, or to know the truth of it, and that this is what is meant, when it is said to be of dangerous consequence to the Articles of the Christian Faith; then, in the first place it is to be acknowledged, that the Proposition intended to be regularly deduced from the other, is certainly of most dangerous consequence to those Persons, who shall suffer themselves to be enslaved by it, and this with respect to Articles of the Christian Faith. But then, in the second place, it is great Injustice to charge Mr. *Lock's* Proposition with that, which can only in Justice be

be laid to the charge of another Proposition; especially to do so before it is proved, and made to appear, that that dangerous Proposition can regularly be inferred from Mr. *Lock's* Proposition, which is a point altogether incapable of being proved, for there is no possibility of shewing any connection between them: The two Propositions are as far distant from one another, as the East is from the West. From what hath been already said, I think it may with reason enough be concluded, that the principal Accusations, advanced against Mr. *Lock's* Proposition, are altogether groundless.

§ VIII. Certainty, or Knowledge did, and will, always consist, in what Mr. *Lock* declares it doth consist; and the way to attain Certainty was always by comparing Ideas. What measures of knowing soever those have, who speak most slightly of the way of Ideas, all their knowledge is owing to it, how little soever they are aware of it, or how strongly soever they are inclined to attribute it to something else. There were Persons, in all Ages, who attained to certain measures of knowledge, and were never able to declare distinctly and fully how they came by their Knowledge. They generally stopped in their Accounts, at the Artificial Methods, whereby they were assisted in comparing of Ideas, (tho' they took no notice of that) which was the true and natural way by which they perceived their agreement or disagreement, and obtained knowledge. Mr. *Lock* is the first Person I have heard of, who hath observed, and acquainted the World, in what

C

Know:

Knowledge, or Certainty doth consist. By which discovery he hath done Mankind so great a kindness, in directing Men plainly to the most certain, easie, and speedy way to attain Knowledge, so far as they are capable of it: And how to bound their Enquiries, so as not to spend their Labours in fruitless Endeavours, to know what is out of Humane reach, and what they can never attain to certainty in, that Men will never be able to pay him thanks enough, for the good Offices he hath done to the World, nor to testifie sufficient Praises unto God, for the Light and Favour he hath reached forth, and imparted unto Mankind by him.

§ IX. The second passage which hath been thought faulty in Mr. Lock's *Essay of Humane Understanding*, is this: *We have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any meer Material Being thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own Ideas, without Revelation, to discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some System of Matter fitly disposed, a Power to perceive and think, or else joyned and fixed to Matter so disposed, a thinking immaterial Substance.* It being in respect of our Notions, not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive, that God can, if he pleases, superadd to our Idea of Matter a Faculty of Thinking, than that he should superadd to it another Substance, with a faculty of Thinking, since we know not wherein Thinking consists, nor to what sort of Substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that power, which cannot be in any created Being, but meerly by the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator.

&c.

&c. *Essay of Humane Understanding*, B. 4. c. 3. § 6. Against this passage, two things are offered: First, It is suggested that it is not consistent with the Souls Immortality; or at least, takes off very much from the evidence of its Immortality. Secondly, It is pretended, that from the Nature of Matter, it may be proved to be false.

§ X. First, It is suggested, that what Mr. *Lock* hath here said, is not consistent with the Souls Immortality, or at least takes off very much from the evidence of its Immortality; for if what Mr. *Lock* doth say be true, it cannot be Demonstratively proved that the Soul is not Material. And if the Soul be nothing but a Material Substance, it must be made up as others are, of the cohesion of solid and separable parts, how minute and invisible soever they be, and must be dissolved when Life is ended. And it takes off very much from the evidence of Immortality, if it depend wholly upon God's giving that, which of its own nature it is not capable of. *Ans.* 1. The Immortality of the Soul doth not depend on our knowing, or perceiving by demonstrative proof, in the way of Reason, that it is Immaterial; nor doth our having a Rational Perswasion, that the Soul is Immortal, depend on our knowing that it is Immaterial.

§ XI. Mr. *Lock* doth not say that the Soul is Material: He owns that we have the highest degree of probability that it is Immaterial, but that we cannot attain to demonstrative Certainty or Knowledge, by comparing the Ideas of Matter and Thinking, that the Soul is an Immaterial Substance, tho' we may this way know

that it is a Spiritual Substance. What Mr. *Lock* saith is this, *We cannot, by the contemplation of our own Ideas, without Revelation, discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some Systems of Matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think; or that we cannot demonstratively prove, by meer Principles of Reason, or Philosophy, either the Materiality or Immateriality of the Soul, but that the point is above our Reason, and what we cannot be fully assured of but by Divine Revelation.* For this his Assertion, he hath produced some Reasons, which have not been proved to be invalid, or weak, by any of those Authors I have seen, who have declared their dislike of this Assertion. And if the Reasons he hath given for his Assertion cannot be refuted, but are solid and unanswerable, it will not be easie to prove that his Assertion may justly be blamed. To prove Mr. *Lock's* Proposition false, either the Materiality, or Immateriality of the Soul, should be demonstratively proved, for he denies that either of them can be demonstratively proved. The surest way to prove the falseness of a Proposition, which denies that a thing can be demonstrated, is to demonstrate that thing. I know an Attempt hath been made, by one who condemns the way of Ideas, as no way at all to Certainty, to demonstrate that Matter cannot Think, or that God cannot superadd to any System of Matter a Power of Thinking; which demonstration is manag'd in the way of Ideas. But tho' what is offer'd there, for demonstration, would sufficiently prove that Solidity is not a Power of Thinking, if that needed proof, yet I think it doth not afford any sort of evidence that Omnipotency can.

cannot superadd both *Solidity*, and a *power of Thinking*, to one and the same Substance, which was the point to be demonstrated. Besides, the way of Ideas being condemned, as no way at all to Certainty, those who are of that mind, cannot with any reason pretend, that what hath been offered for a demonstration of this point, is really a demonstration of it. For if they can think it to be a Demonstration of the point, they cannot avoid being obliged to renounce their *other thought*, and think the quite contrary, whether they may judge it proper and convenient to acknowledge the same openly or no. If what hath been offered for a Demonstration of this point, be really a Demonstration of it, the way of Ideas is undoubtedly a way to Certainty ; yea, and a way to Certainty about a point, which I am inclined to think cannot be demonstrated any other way.

§ XII. 3. If the Soul were *nothing but a material Substance*, what follows those words in the objection might perhaps pass with some for a plain Truth : but for my part, I cannot comprehend how any thing, that hath life, should be nothing but a material Substance ; for Life is no part of, nor hath any necessary connection with the Idea, signified by these words, *Material Substance*. Nor do I perceive any necessity, that a Material Substance endued with Life, must lose its Life, because by some Accident, or within a certain period, the gross and sensible parts of it must fall off from those more fine and insensible parts which God hath ordered to be the Seat of Life. And those who think they can prove demonstratively, that the Soul is a created Immaterial Substance, must take

heed of affirming that the Soul is *nothing but a created Immaterial Substance*, lest that Assertion prove of dangerous consequence to, and inconsistent with the Articles of the Christian Faith ; for if the Soul be nothing but a created Immaterial Substance, it is not a Spiritual, or Thinking Substance ; for the power of Thinking, is a power which God superadds to our Idea, whether of Material, or created Immaterial Substance, and which neither the one, nor the other can have, *but meerly by the good pleasure, and bounty of the Creator*, as Mr. Lock most Judiciously and Piously observes. But Mr. Lock doth not any where say, That the Soul is nothing but a Material Substance, or that we cannot know, by contemplating our Ideas, that the Soul is nothing but a Material Substance. Indeed, Mr. Lock hath these words, *We have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know, whether any Material Being thinks or no.* From these words, *Any meer Material Being*, some may, perhaps, in their haste, have taken occasion to think, that Mr. Lock's Notion was, that for ought we could know, the Soul might be nothing but a Material Substance. To rectifie which mistake, I think it may be sufficient to note, that *meer Material*, in Mr. Lock's Sense, is not oppos'd to a power of Thinking, (which we cannot know but God may superadd to our Idea of Matter) but to an Immaterial Substance, considered as joyned to a Material Being.

§ XIII. 4. It is not very easie to comprehend what is meant by these words, *It takes off very much*

much from the evidence of Immortality, if it depend wholly upon God's giving that, which of its own nature it is not capable of. For no created Substance can have any thing more, than God is pleased to give it. It is not very intelligible to me, that God should give to any thing, that which its nature is not capable of, especially if by Nature be here meant, what I find some Persons do sometimes mean by that word, *viz.* Substance; for what Substance is capable of, even after that solidity is added to it, is more than any Man can know. And if Omnipotency can add a power of Thinking to solid Substance fitly disposed, no Man can be certain that solid Thinking Substance is not of its own nature capable of Immortality; but whether a created Being shall be Mortal or Immortal, is not to be determined by our considering its nature, but by understanding the pleasure of God concerning it. The Humane Nature is the same now it was in the first Ages of the World; but that Men do not now ordinarily live above a hundred Years, is not to be resolved into this, that the Humane Nature is not capable of being continued longer in Life, than that space, but into the pleasure of God, that now Men shall not ordinarily live to a greater Age; for Men did ordinarily, in the first Ages of the World, live many hundreds of Years; and that they did so, was purely to be attributed to the Divine Pleasure. And had it been the pleasure of him, who kept Men then so long in Life, that Men should not die, they would have been Immortal. If the evidence of Immortality,

consists in Immateriality, the Immateriality of the Soul must be demonstratively proved, before Persons can perceive the evidence of the Souls Immortality. For if any person takes it for granted, that the Souls Immateriality may be demonstratively proved from, or by certain Principles of Reason, and from thence perswades himself that the Soul is Immortal, and upon after-trial and examination he shall find that his Principles he depended on are uncertain, and cannot afford him such proof as he was perswaded they would yield, his discovering the uncertainty of his own Principles, which he went upon in point of Reason, will, according to a Notion lately advanced, weaken the Credibility of the Souls Immortality, when considered purely as a Matter of Faith. And if this be true, great and speedy care should be taken to produce demonstrative proof, that the Soul is an Immaterial Substance, not only to make Men certain that their Souls are Immortal, but to secure the Credibility of Divine Testimony. But blessed be God, we have a sure Foundation for our Faith to rest on; for the Testimony of God will never fail, but always remain firm and true, how short soever the Principles of Reason may fall, of bringing us to Certainty or Knowledge, concerning several Articles of Faith, or Propositions, which come to us by Divine Revelation. It may be proved, to the highest degree of probability, that the Soul is Immaterial; but no demonstrative proof being yet produced in the way of Reason, that the Soul is Immaterial, I cannot understand why any person

son should pretend it must follow that the Soul must be Mortal, if it be a Material Substance, with a superadded power or faculty of Thinking; and in that respect, or on that account, a Spiritual Substance, tho' not Immaterial, for Material and Mortal have no necessary connection. And therefore we cannot be certain, by contemplating the Ideas those words stand for, that every Material Substance must be Mortal. And he who shall affirm, that every Material Substance must necessarily be Mortal, will, if he adhere to his Assertion, find himself obliged to deny, at least, two Articles of the Christian Faith, or two Propositions which come to us by Divine Revelation, 1. That Man became Mortal by Sin, or that *the Wages of Sin is Death*; for it is past doubt, that one part of Man, when first created, was Material. And if every Material Substance must necessarily die, Man must have died, tho' he had never sinned. 2. That after the Resurrection Men will be Immortal; for, after the Resurrection, one part of Man will be Material.

§ XIV. Secondly, It is pretended that this passage, in Mr. Lock's Essay, which I have been discoursing of, may from the Nature of Matter be proved to be false. I will, 1st. Say something of this point in general; and then, 2dly. Consider particularly what the last Author I have seen, who finds fault with this passage, doth say concerning it, who I think takes in the whole strength of what others have proposed, who have on this Account formed objections against it.

§ XV.

§ XV. First, I will say something concerning this point in general. Substance, I conceive, will be acknowledged on all hands to be rightly divided into Material and Immaterial; but how many various, different Powers, or Faculties, these sorts of Substances are capable of receiving, is what surpasses Man's Understanding. Yet whatever Powers they are capable of receiving, God can give or superadd unto them if he pleases; whether he hath given to either sort all the Powers it is capable of, is more than we can be certain of, by the bare Exercise of our Reason. He may, for any thing we know to the contrary, give to certain Material Systems fitly disposed, some Powers, which he also gives to Immaterial Substances. Amongst these we may reckon the power of Thinking, which neither Material, nor Immaterial Substances, can have, whether God will or no. And whether it hath been his pleasure to superadd this power only to the Idea we express by Immaterial Substance, or also to the Idea we express by Material Substance, is a point we cannot be fully assured of but by Divine Revelation. The power of Thinking, added to a Substance, whether Material, or Immaterial, makes that Substance, Spirit. Material Substance, Immaterial Substance, and Spirit, are terms which stand for three distinct Ideas. And tho' Spirit, or Spiritual Substance, doth not imply Matter, or Material Substance in its Idea, yet the power of Thinking being superadded to Matter, will make it Spirit, or Spiritual Substance. Just as Spirit doth not imply Immaterial

rial Substance in its Idea, yet the power of Thinking being superadded to Immaterial Substance, makes it Spirit or Spiritual Substance, which it could not be, without a power of Thinking added to it. To ask therefore peremptorily, whether Matter can think or not? is to propose an obscure Question which wants explaining. If by the Question be meant, Can God add a power of Thinking to Matter or no? The Answer will be, We have no demonstrative proof for either part of the Question; and therefore cannot be certain concerning the Matter. But if by the Question be meant, Can Matter Think without having a power of Thinking superadded to it? The Answer is plainly, No. But the way of Arguing, that then the Substance which Thinks must be Immaterial, is not very clear, for Immaterial Substance can no more Think, than Matter can, without a power of Thinking added to it: And whether it be Material, or Immaterial Substance, to which the power of Thinking is added, that Substance thinks, tho' it be by virtue of a power superadded to it, without which it could not think, or considered barely as Material, or Immaterial Substance. Solidity, and a power of Thinking, are perfectly distinct, and quite different Powers; yet if God can superadd a power of Thinking to a solid Substance, there is no necessity that the Substance which Thinks must be Immaterial, for Substance, and a power of Thinking, are as distinct as Material and Immaterial. The Material Substance thinks, tho' not precisely under this consideration, but
as

as having another Power added to it, - whereby it is enabled to do that, which it could not do without it, *viz.* to Think. And tho' the Idea of Thinking will not prove the substance which thinks to be immaterial, it will, if superadded to Matter, prove that the substance which thinks hath another power than that which made it Matter, and will as certainly prove it to be a Spiritual Substance, as Solidity can prove it to be a Material Substance ; Solidity, and a power of thinking, are very different powers, but they are not contradictory. And there is no inconsistency, in supposing that the same substance may have more distinct modifications than one, let them be ever so different one from the other, whilst they are not contradictory. We cannot attain to Certainty, that God cannot add a power of Thinking to Matter, tho' we may that he cannot make the same substance to be material and immaterial at the same time, because this latter is a contradiction.

§ XVI. Secondly, I will now consider what the last Author I have seen, who finds fault with this passage in Mr. *Lock's* Essay, doth say concerning it. This Author is the Reverend Mr. *Jenkin*, who having quoted out of Mr. *Lock's* *Essay of Humane Understanding*, part of what I have before transcribed out of that Book, hath (in the 46 and 47 pages of his *Preface* before his *Reasonableness and Certainty of the Christian Religion*) the words which shall be marked all along as I come to them, as these following words (with which he begins his Reply to what he quoted

ted out of Mr. *Lock*) are, “ But it seems not
 “ intelligible, how God should superadd to
 “ Matter this faculty, or power, or modifica-
 “ tion, of thinking, unless he change the na-
 “ ture of Matter, and make it quite another
 “ thing than it is, or joyn a substance of ano-
 “ ther nature to it. *Ans.* It is very common,
 even with noted Authors, to express themselves
 in such a manner, that tho’ at first view their
 Sentences seem to have a very plausible appear-
 ance, yet, upon a stricter consideration, their
 Sense proves to be so uncertain, and undetermi-
 ned, that it is very hard to know what they do
 mean. I will suppose that here, by, *It seems not*
Intelligible that God should, &c. is meant, That
 Men cannot understand, how God should, or
 can superadd a Power, &c. of Thinking to
 Matter, but either, by changing the nature of
 Matter, or by joyning a Substance of another
 nature to it. And I think it not Intelligible,
 how this proves any thing against Mr. *Lock*’s
 Proposition, to which it is opposed. For tho’
 we cannot understand how God should do this,
 but by one of the ways before-mentioned, (and
 it seems supposed by this Author that we can un-
 derstand how God can do it, either of those
 ways) yet he may do it some other way, which
 is not intelligible to us. And if he can do it,
 in a way, which we cannot understand how he
 should do it, it is most certain, that we cannot
 know, or be certain that he cannot do it. God
 hath done, and does do many things, which
 we cannot understand the manner how he did,
 or does do them. Therefore it is no proof that
 God

God cannot do a thing, because we do not, or cannot understand the manner how he can do it. But seeing God can do things, and we cannot understand how he can do them, this is a very just and good Reason, why we should not pretend to know he hath not done such a thing, when we cannot alledge any thing more to justify our pretence, but this, that we cannot understand how he should do it. If we could understand how God might superadd a power of Thinking to Matter, this would not prove that he has done it. In like manner, our not being able to understand how he should do it, can be no proof that he hath not done it. These words considered as they are offered for an Answer to what Mr. *Lock* hath said, seem to carry with them two suppositions, which should be taken for true: 1. Here is supposed, that God hath not done any thing, which we cannot understand how he should do; which supposition is apparently a mistake, and void of Truth. 2. Here is supposed, that it is intelligible how God should add a Thinking Power to Matter, either of the ways here assigned, but with this intimation, That it can be demonstratively proved, that he hath not done it either of those ways, and therefore that he hath not done it at all. Without these suppositions, I think it not intelligible, how these words can concern what Mr. *Lock* hath said, who doth not side with either part of the Question, Whether God has, or has not, added a Thinking Power to Matter, but saith, That neither part of the Question can be demonstratively proved. To prove this way,

way, against Mr. *Lock*, That God has not added a Power of Thinking to any System of Matter, the truth of both the Suppositions should be made undeniably plain and clear, and then the intimated demonstration should be produced. The demonstration not being laid down, no Judgment can be made of it, nor by it. But the two ways assigned, by which it is supposed intelligible how God should add a Power of Thinking to Matter, may be a little considered. The first way by which it is supposed intelligible, how God might add a power of Thinking to Matter, is, by changing the nature of Matter. And by changing the nature of Matter, I conceive, by the words following, we are to understand, making it quite another thing than it is. Now, I think it is altogether unintelligible, how God should superadd to Matter a Power of Thinking, by making it quite another thing than it is; for then it must cease to be Matter. Indeed, it is not intelligible that God should superadd a Thinking Power to Matter, and not make it another thing, (tho' not quite another thing) than it was before that Power of Thinking was superadded to it. But tho' by superadding that Power to it, it would be made another thing, yet it would not cease to be what it was before: It would still be Matter, tho' nothing but Matter. A new Power cannot be superadded to any thing, but that thing must continue what it was before, tho' by that super-addition it hath what it had not before. Should Matter cease to be Matter, no Power or Faculty could be added to it. Mr. *Lock* saith,

faith, We cannot be fully assured, any other way than by Divine Revelation, whether God has, or has not, super-added a Power of Thinking to any System of matter fitly disposed. Now to say in opposition to this, That God cannot do it, but by making matter quite another thing than it is, doth carry along with it an unintelligible Supposition, or rather an express Contradiction, *viz.* That God can super-add something to matter, by making that same matter cease to be matter. But it is undeniably certain, that if solid Substance be capable of having a Thinking Power super-added to it, God can super-add that Power or Faculty to it, tho' we cannot understand the way or manner how he should do it. And we cannot, by comparing our Ideas, attain to Certainty, or Knowledge, whether matter is capable, or not, of having a Power of Thinking super-added to it, because we cannot this way reach to know the utmost Capacity of matter. And if matter be capable of having that Power super-added to it, we cannot be fully assured any other way than by Divine Revelation, whether God has super-added that Power to any Systems of Matter: For God is not necessarily obliged to super-add to any thing, every Power it may be capable of.

§ XVII. The second way proposed, how God might super-add a Power of Thinking to Matter, is, *By joyning a Substance of another nature to it.* Answ. 1. The joyning of a Substance of another nature to matter, will not super-add a Power of Thinking, unless that Sub-

Substance of another nature has the Power of Thinking joyned to it. The Power of Thinking, is a Power super-added to Substance, whether the Substance be material, or immaterial, to which God is pleased to super-add it. 2. The joyning of an immaterial Thinking Substance to Matter, is not a super-adding to matter the Faculty of Thinking. The Faculty or Power of Thinking in this Case, is appropriated to the immaterial Substances, and is not a Power super-added to matter. 3. It is every jot as unintelligible to us, *how* an immaterial substance should be joyned to a material substance, as how a Power of Thinking should be super-added to a material substance. And I think it altogether unintelligible, that God should super-add a Power of Thinking to Matter, this way. Tho' we cannot understand how God should joyn an immaterial Thinking Substance to some Systems of Matter, yet this cannot be a good Reason why any Man should pretend to be certain, or to know that God cannot, or has not joyned an immaterial Thinking Substance to some Systems of Matter. Neither is it a demonstrative proof, that God cannot, or has not, super-added a Power of Thinking to some Systems of Matter, because, for ought we know, he can, or has joyned an immaterial Thinking Substance to some Systems of Matter. We cannot attain to Certainty concerning what he has done as to these matters, nor can we be fully assured what he has done, but by Divine Revelation. Tho, as Mr. *Lock* saith, we have the highest degree of probability, that the Power

D of

of Thinking is super-added to immaterial substances ; and that those Systems of Matter, in which there is a Power of Thinking, have an immaterial substance joyned to them, to which that Power of Thinking is super-added.

§ XVIII. " But the Question is, Whether a Faculty of Thinking can be produced out of the Powers, and various Modifications of Matter ?

Ans. If this be the Question, it is a very dark and obscure one. The Question, as here worded, seems to suppose, or grant, that Powers are super-added to our Idea of Matter, upon its being variously modified. And then enquires, whether out of those Powers, another Power (*viz.* The Power of Thinking, if that be the meaning here, of the Phrase, a Faculty of Thinking) distinct from them, can be produced ? Now, as one Power cannot operate on another Power, so neither can one Power be produced out of other Powers. To talk of one Power of Matter being produced out of another Power of Matter, seems to me altogether unintelligible ; for I cannot imagine what can be meant by it, unless it be either that one Power of Matter contains, in the Bowels of it, another Power, which may one way or other be extracted out of it, the former still continuing, which I conceive is not consistent with good sense ; or that one Power of Matter doth contribute to its having another Power, which is a little intelligible as the former. And is much the same thing, as to say, That that Power of Matter which makes it *Iron*, contributes something to its having that Power which makes it

Gold

Gold: Or that that Power which makes Matter to be *Wax*, contributes to its having that Power which makes it a *Loadstone*: Whereas the Powers which make Matter to be *Gold*, and *Loadstones*, are as perfectly different from the Powers which make Matter to be *Iron*, and *Wax*, as they are from that Power which makes Matter to be *Wood*, or from those Powers which make Matter to be any of those other things to which we assign other *Specifick Names*. As Matter being modified a certain way, has a certain power super-added to it, which it had not before it was so modified, so, being modified another way, it hath another power super-added to it, different from the former. Now it is not possible we should know how many powers may be super-added to Substance, whether having, or not having, the modification of Solidity, unless we could accurately understand how many ways it can be modified. A thousand Questions may be proposed concerning Powers, whether they can be super-added to a Substance that has the modification of Solidity upon its being variously modified, to which no Answer can be given, which can be demonstratively proved. And amongst other Reasons, because we cannot know the precise modifications, on which those Powers must depend, we are not admitted so far into the Secrets of Nature, as to be able to take cognizance of all the various real Constitutions, on which all the Powers, which may be super-added to our Idea of Matter, may depend. If before any Man knew any thing of the *Loadstone*, this Question had been put, *viz.* Whether God had super-added to a System of Matter,

fitly disposed, a power to draw Iron to it ? No Man then living could have given an Answer to it, which he could have proved demonstratively. Had the Question been answer'd negatively, we are now very well assured, the Answer had been false. If the Answer had been affirmative, tho' it had been really true, yet the Answer could not then have been proved demonstratively. The Question, with relation to what Mr. *Lock* hath said, seems to me to be this, Whether a demonstrative proof can be produced that it is, or is not the pleasure of God, that a Power of Thinking shall be super-added to our Idea of Matter, upon a System of Matter being modified in a certain manner ? And this Question cannot be satisfactorily resolved any other way, than by producing a demonstrative proof either of the one part of the Question, or of the other ; for till the demonstrative proof is produced, we must continue uncertain, and ought to acknowledge, that the point surmounts our view, is too difficult for us to resolve demonstratively, and that it doth not come within our notice. Mr. *Lock* doth not discourse there, of what may be produced out of the Powers, and various modifications of Matter, but of what God can super-add, if he please, to Matter fitly disposed : So that, the Question here cannot be, Whether a Power or Faculty of Thinking will necessarily result out of the Powers of Matter, upon its being in a certain manner modified ? But whether Omnipotency cannot give to a System of Matter, fitly disposed, a power of Thinking, which could not be produced out of the Powers and
various

Various Modifications of Matter ? There is no reason at all to imagine, that the Power of Thinking must be produced out of the Powers and various Modifications of Matter, because a System of Matter, *fitly disposed*, is taken notice of as requisite, or necessary, in order to its having a Power of Thinking super-added to it. For that the Matter be *fitly disposed* is necessary, whether God give the power of Thinking immediately to it, or mediately, *viz.* By joyning to it an immaterial Thinking Substance. And as it doth not follow, that because the System of Matter must be *fitly disposed*, to have an immaterial Thinking Substance joyned to it, therefore this immaterial Thinking Substance can be, or is produced out of the Powers, and various modifications of Matter ; so neither doth it follow, that because the Matter must be *fitly disposed*, to have a Power of Thinking, given or super-added to it, therefore the Power of Thinking can be, or is produced out of the Powers and various Modifications of Matter. Which ever way it is, that a power of Thinking is lodged in, or super-added to a System of Matter *fitly disposed*, there is something added to the System of matter so disposed, by the good Pleasure and Bounty of God, which could not be produced out of the Powers, and various modifications of matter. But *how* God does it, which ever way it is, is alike unintelligible to us ; nor can we demonstrate which way it is.

§ XIX. “ And we can have no more Con-
 “ ception, how any modification of matter can
 “ produce Thinking, than we can how any

⁸⁸ modification of Sound should produce Seeing.

Ans. Allowing all this to be true, it is no demonstration of that for which it is brought. If there is any strength in this Proposition, with relation to what it should prove, it must lie either in the term *How*, or in these words, *We can have no Conception*; or else, *In the comparing of the Modifications of Matter, with the Modifications of Sound*: And Arguing, or Inferring, that because, or if no modification of sound can produce Seeing, then no modification of matter can produce Thinking. That which this Proposition should prove is this, That the Power of Thinking cannot be super-added; or that it is not the pleasure of God, that the Power of Thinking shall be super-added to Solid Substance, let it be modified in what manner soever. Now, first of all, If the force of the Proposition brought to prove this, do lie in the term *How*, it must derive its force from this Supposition, That no power can be super-added to Solid Substance, however modified, but what we can conceive *How* it should be super-added to it. That is, That no System of Matter, whose real Constitution we cannot accurately understand, can have any power; which is, in effect, to affirm, That solid Substance cannot have any power super-added to it. For all the Powers that all Systems of Matter can have, depending entirely on their real Constitutions, to which we are perfect Strangers, none of them must have any powers at all, because we cannot conceive *how* any powers should be super-added to solid substance, or cannot conceive their real Consi-

Constitutions, or not exactly understand the precise modifications of Matter, whereby they are made such Systems. Secondly, If the force of the Proposition spoken of, consists in these words, *We can have no Conception*, then it derives its force from this Supposition, That no power can be super-added to solid substance, but what we can conceive can be super-added to it, tho' we may not be able to conceive how it can be super-added to it. Now this is a Supposition that makes all the Powers of all Systems of matter, to depend not on their real Constitutions, but on our Ability, to conceive that they can have them; whereas there are innumerable Powers super-added to solid Substance, which we cannot conceive can be added to it, because those Systems of Matter, which have them, come not under our observation and notice. This must needs be acknowledged by all, who do not fancy that all Material Beings fall under their inspections, and that they can take a Survey of every one of them. Moreover, we can conceive certain Powers to be super-added to certain Systems of matter, which are not super-added to them; of which, a multitude of Instances might be given, there being nothing almost more common, than for Persons to conceive that certain Systems of matter have such Powers as they really have not. Thirdly, If the force of this Proposition doth lie in comparing *the modifications of Matter* with *the modifications of Sound*, and inferring, that if no modification of *Sound* can produce *Seeing*, that then no modification of matter can produce *Thinking*, then the term

How, and these words, *We can have no Conception*, are super-numerary ; for if they cannot impart any strength to either part of the Proposition considered absolutely, they cannot add any weight to the comparison. Leaving out therefore those words, the Proposition is thus, *Any modifications of matter can no more produce Thinking, than any modifications of sound can produce Seeing.* This Proposition is true, both the parts of it are so ; but then it is not any thing to the purpose, for which it was intended. Turn it into an Hypothetical Proposition, that it may have the form or appearance of an Argument, and it must run thus, *If no modification of sound can produce Seeing, then no modification of matter can produce Thinking.* Here both the Antecedent and Consequent are true, but then the Consequence can never be proved ; there is no connection between the Proposition inferred, tho' it is true, and the Proposition from which it is inferred, tho' that also is true. The reason why both the Antecedent and Consequent are true, is, because no modification can produce an Act : And therefore, had the Proposition run thus, *If no modification can produce an Act, then no modification of matter can produce Thinking*, then the consequence had been unexceptionable. But in the former Proposition, the Inference hath no ground at all to support it, because the deduction is not from this, *That modifications cannot act*, but from such a sort of modifications, as could not produce the Act specified, supposing that modifications could produce Acts ; for if a modification could produce

produce an Act, a modification of matter might produce Thinking, tho' no modification of Sound could produce Seeing. But *Thinking*, and *Seeing*, being both Acts, they must suppose Powers, and the enquiry not being whether modifications can act, for it is past doubt that modifications cannot act: For not modifications, but substances so and so modified, or having such and such Powers, are Agents, and do produce Acts. The Proposition will come nearer to the subject we are discoursing of, if it be worded thus, If no modification of sound can produce the power of seeing, then no modification of matter can produce the power of thinking. Now because I do not know what Notions some Persons may have of modifications producing powers, or in what sense they may understand those words, I will state the present Enquiry as plainly as I can, and then consider this Proposition or Argument more particularly. We are very sensible that it is the pleasure of Almighty God, that solid substances being variously modified, should have several Powers, by which Powers they are fitted and enabled to do several sorts of Acts, or produce various Effects. The Enquiry therefore is, Whether it can be demonstratively proved that it is, or is not the pleasure of God, that matter being in a certain manner modified, should have a power of thinking, whereby it may be enabled to think? And to demonstrate that it is not the pleasure of God, that matter, however modified, should have a power of thinking super-added to it, this Argument is proposed, *viz.* That if no modification of sound can produce the

the power of seeing, then no modification of matter can produce the power of thinking. The sense then of this Argument must be this, If it is not the pleasure of God, that a power of seeing should be super-added to sound, what way soever it can be modified, then it is not the pleasure of God, that a power of thinking should be super-added to matter, whatever way it can be modified. Now, this is apparently so un-concluding a Proposition, I cannot think any Man will insist on it, or pretend, that by modifications of sound producing a power of seeing, can be meant producing that power in it self; but that, because various modifications of sound do produce various sensations in other things, therefore producing the power of seeing, must be understood of producing it in other subjects. Let the Argument then, to its utmost advantage, run thus, If it is not the pleasure of God, that a power of seeing should be super added upon any modification of sound, to those subjects in which the various modifications of sound do ordinarily produce certain sensations, then it is not the pleasure of God that a power of thinking should be super-added to solid substance, in what manner soever it can be modified. That I may neither pass over this Argument, without taking any notice of it, nor yet bear too hard upon it, I will only offer these three Considerations concerning it, 1. That supposing the Argument to have any strength in it, it would labour under this unhappiness, That it would prove a great deal more than it should. 2. That such a Reason may be assigned, why no modification of sound

found can produce Seeing, or why it is not the pleasure of God that a power of seeing should be super-added upon any modification of sound, &c. as the like cannot be assigned, that it is not the pleasure of God, that a power of thinking should be super-added to matter upon its being in a certain manner modified. 3. That we cannot argue regularly from the modifications of sounds, to the modifications of matter. First, That supposing this Argument to have any strength in it, it hath too much: It would labour under this unhappiness, That it would prove a great deal more than it should, and quite over-turn the whole course and order of Nature, and the ordinary Providence of God in the material World. For the Argument cannot be restrained and limited to the power of thinking, but must, and will reach, to all powers in matter, and so prove that it is not the pleasure of God, that any power should be super-added to matter, upon its being any way modified; which, to me, has this sound with it, That tho' it is the pleasure of God, that matter may be variously modified, yet it is not the pleasure of God that it should have any power at all, *i.e.* Be capable of any Action. Place any other powers in the room of those which are named, the Argument will be every jot as good as it is, and the Propositions, of which it consists, will be every whit as true as they are with these that are mentioned. And therefore I forbear to reflect on the fundamental Error that presseth the Argument, and on that faulty Presumption this way of Arguing imports, in under-

taking

taking to determine what is, or is not the pleasure of God, without any either Real, or Verbal Discovery from him, concerning it. Secondly; Such a Reason may be assigned why it is not the pleasure of God, that a power of Seeing should be super-added upon any modification of sound, to those Subjects, in which the various modifications of sounds do usually produce certain Sensations; the like to which, cannot be assigned, Why it is not the pleasure of God that a power of Thinking should be super-added to matter, upon its being in a certain manner modified, for sound, and the various modifications of it, are only Ideas in our Minds, and are in the Bodies we denominate from them, only powers to produce those Sensations in us, to which we give the Names by which we call them. *Loud, Shril, &c.* in Idea, are but the certain Bulk, Figure and Motion, of the insensible parts in the Bodies themselves, which cause those Sensations in us. They are but certain Powers, that are in Bodies, by reason of the particular Constitutions of their primary Qualities, to operate after a particular manner on one certain Sense, or Organ of Sense, *viz.* The Ear, by agitating variously the Animal Spirits, which are in that Organ when duly disposed to receive their impressions. The same modification of matter may produce in it a power, which will produce in us different Sensations, but by operating on different Organs of Sense, fitted to receive its impressions. One and the same modification in the external Object, may produce different Effects or Sensations in us, because it operateth on different

rent Organs, adapted in us for different purposes. The various modifications of sound cannot produce in us seeing, because it is the pleasure of God, that the Ideas those Bodies communicate to us, which we call in general various modifications of sound, should be conveyed to us not by the *Eye*, but only by the *Ear*, from whence they are distinguished from those Ideas we are to receive by our Eyes. We have in this matter a plain real discovery of the pleasure of God, but we have not the like in the other case, about which the Argument I am speaking of is concerned. But the true reason why no modification of sound can produce a power of Seeing, is because neither sound, nor any modification of it, can produce any power at all: They can no more produce a Power of Hearing, than they can a Power of Seeing. Let the Organ of Hearing be disordered, and have no Animal Spirits in it, that can be agitated by external Objects, no sounds, nor modifications of sound, can produce a Power of Hearing in it. Thirdly, That we cannot argue regularly from the modifications of sound, or of any sensible qualities to the modifications of matter; and the reason of this is evident, *viz.* Because they do differ *Toto Cælo*. The modifications of sounds, are only Ideas in our minds; the modifications of matter, are the real, but unknown Constitutions of things existing in Nature. If there can be any room to argue concerning Thinking, from the modifications of Sound, it cannot be concerning the Power of Thinking, but only about the modifications of Thought. Thus, if
 any

any Man should offer any thing concerning the modifications of Thought, so incoherent as this is, *viz.* That the modifications of sound can produce Seeing, this obvious inconsistency may be made use of regularly enough, to convince him, and others, of the Absurdity and Incoherence of the other Assertion. But to say that a power of Thinking cannot be super-added to the substance of matter in any case, because the Ideas we receive only by one sense, cannot be got by another sense, hath no connection at all, and is so far from being a demonstration, it is not good sense. In short, the whole of this Argument amounts to no more than this, If secondary qualities cannot produce Powers (which it is certain they cannot) then God cannot, by the modification of its primary qualities, give Powers to matter; whereas all the Powers of matter, so far as we can observe, depend on them, as their Source, Spring, and Original, by the Pleasure and Ordination of God, as appears by the whole Series and Order of Nature and Providence. These words, *We can have no more Conception how any modification of matter can produce Thinking, than we can, how any modification of Sound should produce Seeing,* must be understood concerning the Reality of a Consequent or Effect, following upon a System of matter being fitly disposed or modified, either to receive a Power which it had not before, or to occasion an Act in a Subject endowed with a certain Power to Act in a certain manner upon certain occasions. Now, I conceive, it is past all doubt, that various modifications of matter are necessary

necessary to occasion, if not produce, certain different Acts in Subjects which are endued with Power to exert those different Acts, on different Occasions, tho' we may not know how those different modifications of matters do occasion or produce those different Acts. And tho' no modifications of matter can produce Thinking in the System of Matter, which is the Subject of those modifications, yet a certain modification of matter, may be requisite and necessary to the preparing and making a System of Matter meet to receive a Power of Thinking. And I think it equally easie to conceive, how any modification of Sound should produce Seeing in the Bell, or Harp, &c. that makes the sound, as how it should produce Hearing in it.

§ XX. " All Modifications of Matter are the same as to this point. *Ans^w*. If it is not the pleasure of God, that a Power of Thinking should be super-added to our Idea of Matter, upon any modification of it, then all modifications of Matter are the same as to that point. And it is acknowledged very probable, that it is not the pleasure of God to super-add a Power of Thinking to matter any way modified. Yet bare saying, that all modifications are the same as to that point, is not proving it; and it is not probable proof we are looking after, (tho' such hath not yet come under consideration) but demonstrative proof. Mr. *Lock* saith we have the highest degree of probability; those therefore who will oppose him, ought to take care, that what they offer be true demonstration, otherwise all they say will be to no purpose. That
Matter

Matter being variously modified hath different Powers, the several Objects we converse with do clearly demonstrate. And we shall hardly be able to demonstrate, that all modifications of matter are the same, as to the power of Thinking, till we attain to know what are all the Modifications and Powers that Matter is capable of, unless we can give such true Accounts of the nature of Matter, and the nature of Thought, as will demonstrate that these two are incompatible; which we cannot do, without understanding exactly in what the nature of each doth consist. All modifications of Matter are no more the same, as to Matter having a Power of Thinking super-added to it, than they are the same as to Matter having an Immaterial Thinking Substance joyned to it. And I believe all modifications of Matter are not thought by this Reverend Author, to be the same as to this point; for if they be, *a Thinking Rock, or a Thinking Post*, would be every whit as intelligible as a Thinking Man.

§ XXI. “ And Matter may as well be made
 “ no Matter, by modifying, as be made to
 “ Think by it. *Ans.* This is Affirming, but
 not Demonstrating. That Matter should be
 made no Matter by modifying it, is altogether
 unintelligible, and impossible; for let it be mo-
 dify'd ever so many ways, it will still be Mat-
 ter. It may be proved Demonstratively, that
 Matter cannot be made no Matter, by modi-
 fying it; and if demonstrative proof were pro-
 duced, that Matter, however modify'd, can-
 not have a Power of Thinking, the Dispute
 would

would be at an end. But that Matter, under a certain modification, should think, when a Power of Thinking is super-added to it, is consistent enough, and as intelligible, as that it should exert any other A&t, when it hath a Power super-added to it, to exert that A&t. It is not said that Matter is made to think by any modifications, that are proper to it considered barely as Matter, tho' by some of these modifications of the Substance, which we know not, it may, for ought we know, be disposed and made fit to have a Power of Thinking super-added to it, by which it shall be enabled to think. This Power of Thinking is not proper or peculiar to material Substance ; nor can we prove demonstratively that it is so to Immaterial Substance ; but for any thing we know to the contrary, it may be super-added both to the one and to the other. For if the same Substance may be so modified as to be sometimes material, and sometimes immaterial, (as is granted in this very Dispute) it is not impossible to suppose it may have the Power of Thinking, when it is material, as when it is immaterial: For as the Power of Thinking, when super-added to Immaterial Substance, doth not make it cease to be Immaterial, so being super-added to material Substance, it doth not make it cease to be material ; tho' being super-added to both, it makes both to be Spiritual Substances, which neither of them could be without it.

§ XXII. " This is just as if a Man should
 " maintain, That tho' all Immaterial Substan-
 " ces are not extended and divisible, yet some

“ of them may possibly be; or Omnipotence
 “ may super-add to them a Faculty of Extension
 “ and Divisibility; for Immaterial Substances
 “ may become Divisible and Material by the
 “ same Philosophy, by which we may conclude
 “ that Matter may Think; which is the
 “ same thing as to become Immaterial, and to
 “ surpass all the Powers and Capacities of Matter.
 “ *Ans^w.* Our Author is here got as far from
 his point as he was before, when upon the
 Modifications of Sound; for here he is gone
 from the Modifications of Matter, to the Trans-
 mutation of Substances. That I may do this
 Paragraph, and the Point discoursed of, what
 Right I can in a few words, I will, 1. Offer one
 Consideration concerning the Subject of our
 Discourse. 2. Shew what I apprehend is the
 great mistake of those who write against what
 Mr. *Lock* hath said concerning it. 3. Take notice
 of some mistakes in this Paragraph. First, I
 will propose one Consideration concerning the
 Subject of our Discourse, *viz.* That the Power
 of Thinking being a Power super-added to Substance,
 and all Substance being either Material or Immaterial,
 the Substance to which this Power of Thinking is
 super-added must be of one of those sorts. It is not
 made either the one or the other, by having that
 Power super-added to it; tho’ being super-added,
 it makes the Substance, to which it is super-added,
 Spiritual Substance. As the Power of producing
 in any Sensitive Animal the Idea of Blueness or
 Acidity, or any other distinct Power being
 super-added to any solid Substance, doth not
 make

make that Substance Matter, but only makes it to be a Substance to which such a Denomination will belong, as doth arise from its having such a Power super-added to it, when the Substance is considered precisely as having that Power. The precise Denomination to be added to Substance, upon its having any Power super-added to it, is to be taken from the Power which is super-added to it, without considering what other Power that Substance hath ; from which it will be denominated, when consider'd as having that Power. If it be said, that to be Immaterial, and to Think, be the same, that is not true, for the Negation of one Modification in Substance, *viz.* Solidity, is not the Position of another Modification in Substance, *viz.* Thought. Immaterial Substance is alike capable of having Solidity, or Thought, or both those Modifications, or any other Modifications super-added to it, which it shall please God to super-add to it. Perhaps, it will be said, that the same Substance has indeed a Power, or is capable of Thought, or of Solidity, whenever God pleases to bestow either of them on it, but that God cannot give Solidity, and Thought, to any Substance both together. Now, this is the very Question in Debate, and remains to be demonstrated. If it be said that Actual Thinking is to Immaterial Substance as Actual Solidity is to Material Substance, inseparable from it, these two things are to be demonstrated, 1. That God has created any Substances that must be always in Action, or else cease to be Substances, *i. e.* Substances of such a nature, from which God cannot take

away the Action they have, without destroying the Substance it self; or that God hath created a Substance that must always Think, for Thinking is an Action. 2. That if it be so, how it will follow from thence, that because God has made some Substances not Solid which Think always, therefore he cannot give to Substances, that have the Modification of Solidity, a Power to Think sometimes. Solidity, and Thinking, are evidently distinct Ideas, and we not knowing what Modifications may be super-added to our Idea of Substance without Solidity, cannot prove that every Immaterial Substance has the Modification of Thinking super-added to it; and therefore we cannot prove that it has the same proportion to Immaterial Substance, that Solidity has to Material. If it be said, But we know that some Immaterial Substances have the Power of Thinking, I answer, true. But can we thence demonstratively infer, that the Power of Thinking cannot be super-added to any Material Substances without making them Immaterial? We know that Mobility is super-added to some Material Systems, can we thence demonstratively infer, that Mobility cannot be super-added to Immaterial Substances, without making them Material?

§ XXIII. Secondly, I will mention what I apprehend is the Grand mistake of those who argue against what Mr. *Lock* hath said concerning this Point. Their Discourses seem to intimate, that they think that there are but two sorts of Modification which can be super-added to our General Idea of Substance, viz. Solidity,

ty, and Thinking. Hence I conceive it is, that they make *Immaterial*, and *the Power of Thinking*, to stand for the same Idea; and that they are so positive, that should a Power of Thinking be super-added to Matter, Matter would be made no Matter; and that some, with an express rejecting of the consideration of modified Matter, do ask, Can Matter Think? Which Question so put, seems to me, to be in other words, This, is Solidity, Thinking? If Matter can Think, it is not by virtue of Solidity, but by virtue of such a Power super-added to the Substance, under a certain Modification, that it may Think, tho' it be Solid. If the Power of Thinking can be super-added to Matter, it is not the Power or Modification which can Think, but that to which the Modification or Power is super-added, *viz.* The Substance which has the Modification of Solidity. To ask therefore, whether Matter can Think, and at the same time expressly exclude all consideration of the Power of Thinking, is to ask whether Substance can Think by the sole virtue of Solidity? Or whether the Power of Thinking is included in our Idea of Solidity? Which is much what, as to ask whether Substance can produce that Act by virtue of one Power, which it cannot produce but by virtue of another. What occasion can there be to ask such a question, unless it proceed from an opinion that Substance, having the Modification of Solidity, cannot have any other Power super-added to it, but what must depend upon its Solidity? For if it can, and amongst others this of Thinking, then tho' solid Substance cannot think

meerly as it is Solid, yet having the Power of Thinking super-added to it, it may think. How many sorts of modifications can be super-added to our Idea of Substance, surpasses our comprehension, but any modification super-added to it, will entitle it to a denomination answerable to that modification; and that denomination, together with another Name, or with words signifying a denial of it, added to substance, will as perfectly divide substance, as the Terms Material and Immaterial do. Upon another modification being super-added to either of those kinds of substances, another denomination will belong to it, when considered meerly with relation to that modification. Should the modification of Motion be alone super-added to our Idea of substance, it would make it Substance with motion. And Mobile and Immobile Substance, would as perfectly divide Substance, as solid and unsolid Substance, *i. e.* Material and Immaterial do. This Mobile Substance could not certainly be concluded by us to have either the modification of Solidity, or of Thinking, by reason of its Mobility. Should Mobility be super-added to a substance, which hath the modification of Solidity, it would be a substance with Solidity and Mobility. Should the modification of Thinking be super-added to a Substance which hath those other modifications, it would be a substance with Solidity, Mobility, and the Power of Thinking. That which would move, and think, would be Matter, or solid Substance; the super-adding of the modification of Thinking, would not destroy the other modifications; that which would think

think would be Matter, as well as that which would move : For the modification could not think, but that which had the modification of Solidity, *viz.* The Substance. We are sensible that it is the pleasure of God, that various Powers should be super added to solid Substance, upon its being variously disposed or modify'd. How many the Powers be, which it is the pleasure of God shall be super-added to our Idea of Matter, upon its being variously disposed, we cannot tell. Hereupon this Question is put, whether it is the pleasure of God, that the modification or power of Thinking shall be super-added to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed ? Mr. *Lock* saith, The Question is too abstruse and difficult for us to resolve demonstratively. In opposition to this, or to prove the contrary, it is ask'd whether Matter, without any regard to modifications, can think ? Now can this import any thing else, than either that the super-adding of modifications, to our Idea of Matter, signifies not any thing to Matter's producing certain Acts, or that no modifications can be super-added to our Idea of Matter ? If modifications can be super-added, neither this Question, nor the Answer that belongs to it, can contribute any thing to the proving that the modification of Thinking cannot be superadded to our Idea of Matter.

§ XXIV. Thirdly, I will mention some of the mistakes which may be observed in the Paragraph before set down. First, It supposes several things, every one of which is wrong, as 1. The words referring equally to both the parts of the sentence which goes immediately before them,

and taking them to be the same in sense, tho' different in words, suppose Mr. *Lock* to say, in effect, that matter may, by modifying, be made no matter; for which there is not any ground, but a mistaken Imagination. 2. It supposes that it hath been demonstratively proved, that the modification of thinking cannot be superadded to a solid substance. 3. That it is as Intelligible, that Immateriality may be super-added to our Idea of Matter, as that that modification, which makes substance to be matter, may be super-added to our Idea of substance. 4. That Mr. *Lock* concludes, that the modification of Thinking may be super-added to matter, whereas he saith it cannot be demonstratively concluded. 5. That Immaterial, in the strictest sense of that Term, as contradistinguished from matter, (for so the word is to be understood in the present Dispute) and the Power of Thinking, stand for the same Idea. 6. That we can know all the modifications or powers Matter is capable of; for without that, we cannot know what surpasses all the Powers and Capacities of Matter, except what is a contradiction to our Idea of Matter, which a Power of Thinking cannot be proved to be, by bare saying, That Immaterial, and a Power of Thinking, are the same. In short, the point is thus: We have full Conviction that there is a Power of Thinking in some Systems of Matter. Hereupon a Question arises, Whether this modification of Thinking be the modification of the same substance that has the modification of Solidity, or the modification of another Substance, which not being solid,

lid, is united to the material substance ? Some answer it is a modification of the substance of that matter ; others answer it is a modification of an Immaterial substance, joyned to those Systems of Matter. Mr. *Lock* saith the Question cannot be demonstratively determined, but that the highest degree of probability is on their side, who say it is a modification of an immaterial substance. This displeases : Therefore to demonstrate that a Power of Thinking cannot be super-added to our Idea of Matter, or be a modification of Matter, we are told that Immaterial, and a Power of Thinking, are the same Idea ; and that a Power of Thinking cannot be super-added to our Idea of matter, but matter must be made Immaterial, or no matter. Now, it is most evident, that *Immaterial*, and a *Power of Thinking*, are as distinct Ideas, as *Material* and *Immaterial* be. And that should Matter be made no Matter, or be changed into Immaterial Substance, Substance would only lose that modification which made it matter, and that it could not think till the modification or power of thinking should be superadded to it. Secondly, The Instance proposed in this Paragraph is not rightly stated : If we would propose a Case concerning Immaterial Substances, that should be parallel to that which hath been under our consideration, we should first fix on some positive modification, which is as essential to all Substances which have not the modification of Solidity, as Solidity is to all those which are material. To say, the modification of Thinking is so, is *but saying*. How can we know that every substance
that

that is not solid, hath the power of thinking super-added to it? Having fixed on this modification, we should fix on another modification, that the Question being proposed, Whether it is a modification of immaterial substance, or no? More probable Arguments might be produced on the one side than on the other, but no demonstrative proof could be brought either way. If in this case, some should be positive that it is a modification of Immaterial Substance, and the highest probability was on their side, others should be as peremptory on the other side; and at last, a Person of greater Consideration and Temper, should say the point does not admit of any demonstrative proof, but probability carries it for them, who say, it is a modification of Immaterial substance, and that therefore we must leave the point (till demonstrative proof can be produced one way or other) as God hath laid it before us, and follow, and be contented with probability, whilst God is not pleased to afford us any greater Light concerning it; what damage would any way redound from this persons saying thus? Would that Wise, Prudent, and Good Man, and Lover of Truth, deserve to be evilly reflected on, because he would check Peoples vain Curiosity, convince the Materialists that they fight against the highest degrees of Probability, and put others in mind that they should not give the Adversaries to a good Cause, the Advantages they do, by presuming to know more of the point, than it is the pleasure of God they should know of it in this imperfect Estate? I speak not this with respect to the Reverend
 Mr.

Mr. *Jenkin*, (who concludes his Discourse with these words, *But tho' I have, upon this occasion, mentioned this Gentleman here, yet it would be a great injury done him, to rank him with the Authors of the Oracles of Reason*) but some other Writers, who have on this occasion Indulged a *Licentiousness*, which Moral Heathens would be ashamed of. Thirdly, There is not any thing in this Paragraph, nor in all that this Learned Author hath said, with relation to what Mr. *Lock* hath delivered, that can any more prove that the modification of Thinking cannot be super-added to our Idea of Matter, than it can that other modifications cannot be super-added to it. For Instance, Let a Person, who hath a mind to affirm that the modification, or power of active moving, or motivity, cannot be super-added to our Idea of Matter, but that it is a modification peculiar to Immaterial Substance, place a power of moving in this, and the foregoing Sentences, in the room of a power of Thinking, and those very words will as fully demonstrate his point, as they do the other.

§ XXV. That which may be regularly deduced from the passage in Mr. *Lock's Essay of Humane Understanding* before quoted, and on which so many have thought fit to reflect, is this, That People should not pretend a demonstrative certainty concerning Things, which cannot be demonstratively proved; which is a very great Truth, and which would be of extraordinary good use, would People strictly and rigidly govern themselves by it. The greatest Service that can be done to *Truth* and *Godliness*, is to preserve
our

our Reason within its proper Bounds, and to let Faith have its just scope. I very much question, whether any thing can give bad Men greater advantage in their endeavouring to promote Scepticism, and in their opposing and talking against the Articles of the Christian Faith, than Christians, and especially Divines, or Clergymens detracting any way from the Credibility of Divine Testimony, and making an Ostentation of knowing Things which God hath placed perfectly out of Humane reach; And treating others scurrilously, who are more modest, and more inquisitive than themselves, because they will not acknowledge that the Truth of certain Propositions can be demonstrated, meerly because they say, They can, tho' they will not be prevailed with, to be at the pains to demonstrate their Truth.

F I N I S.

E R R A T A.

PAGE 2. l. 33. for *Natural* r. *Material*. p. 12. l. 10. r. *Consistent*. p. 13. l. 11. r. *Revelation*. p. 16. l. 27. r. *pretended*. p. 17. l. 18. r. *knowledge*. p. 22. l. 20. after *any* r. *meer*. p. 31. l. 29. after *tho'* r. *not*. p. 33. l. 10. r. *Substance*. p. 46. l. 1. for *offer* r. *affirm*.

